Atomic industry disinformation while the disaster happens
Last weeks, I have been following the accidents at the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant closely. Overall there is a severe lack of details on what was happening at the plant. For a big part that is caused by the situation on the plant itself: the parts that matter most right now are inaccessible because of the high radiation levels. So it is impossible for anybody to completely asses the situation. Right in the beginning two organizations stepped into the information vacuum and offered good overviews of the available data: the Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) and World Nuclear News, the news channel of the World Nuclear Association (WNA). These organizations where the first to present exact data and analysis. But at the moment of the first hydrogen explosions at the plants, it became clear the JAIF and WNA were of little value. Let me explain that a bit:
In a nuclear plant there are two potential sources of hydrogen: splitting water by radiation and as by product when zirconium (used as casing for the uranium) reacts with steam and starts to burn. The first one is a small, but steady, source of hydrogen. I doubt if it would be enough to cause the explosions we have seen. So the reaction with the zirconium is the most likely suspect. But that reaction only happens at extreme high temperatures, temperatures close to the melting point of steel and just a little below the temperature needed to melt the zirconium itself. So once the reactors said 'boom', we could know almost for sure that some fuel rods had melted. And melting the fuel rods is by definition a meltdown. Although JAIF quickly admitted 'the integrity of the fuel was damaged', it took them two more weeks to use the word 'meltdown' for the situation in one of the reactors. What about the two other reactors with 'damaged fuel integrity'?
Experts with insight in the operation of nuclear reactors, like the JAIF and the WNA, could have known that the spent fuel pools could become a problem too: they can judge how much heath the spend fuel still emits and thus how long those pools can last without cooling. The operators know how much heat the spend fuel generates and the dimensions of the pool are also known. Once you know those two variables, it is trivial to calculate how long it takes for the water to start boiling and how long it takes before the water is boiled away if you can't cool the pools. The experts from the JAIF and WNA could easily foresee the problems with the spend fuel pools and should have warned for it. But contrary happened: The spend fuel pool of reactor 4 caused an hydrogen explosion, so the fuel rods in there must have boiled dry and must have been extremely hot and burning. Still the JAIF states the fuel integrity is 'possibly damaged'. Well, they are damaged for sure. 'Possibly damaged' would even for the spend fuel in reactor 3 be an understatement, that fuel is 'probably damaged', although JAIF just notices 'damage suspected'. The fuel of reactor 3 contains the highly radio-toxic plutonium, so extra precaution should be in place there. Not warning for the spent fuel pools is severe, because the spent fuel pools have only one containment: the outer building, while the reactors have three. So accidents with the spent fuel are far less contained.
For the next piece of disinformation, it is important to know there are three layers of shielding around the reactor: the inner shielding is the 'pressure vessel', an thick steel reactor vessel designed to operate under pressure and high temperatures. Around it is the 'containment vessel' an thick concrete bunker, build as extra shielding and to keep the nuclear fuel in, if the pressure vessel fails. The containment vessel is in its turn placed in the reactor building, a more or less normal industrial building. The JAIF reports the 'reactor pressure vessel structural integrity' as unknown for reactors 1-3. The containment vessel structural integrity' is reported as 'not damaged (estimation)' for reactor 1 and 3 and as 'damage and leakage suspected' for reactor 2. But looking at the pressure readings of reactor 3 there is something strange: the pressure inside the pressure vessel is lower then the pressure in the containment vessel, while water is injected into reactor 3 all the time. If that water can't go anywhere, the pressure should rise, like it did in reactor 1. But in reactor 3 the pressure stays low, partly even below the atmospheric pressure. That means the water can flow away to a lower point. Not very surprising: out of the pressure vessel, through the containment vessel and out of the reactor building are pipes to turbine building. And indeed: in the basement of the turbine building there is a pool of extremely radioactive water. The injection of the water has resulted in washing damaged fuel out of all containments into a different building. The valves that should have stopped that, must have failed. So the status of the containment vessels, as reported by the JAIF, are irrelevant here. What is relevant, is that the core of the reactor is washed out of its containment. But the JAIF and the WNA don't tell us.
Finally the JAIF has some reassuring words on the level of radioactive contamination around the plant. In each report they mention the radiation levels at the gate of the plant, which is raised, but not alarmingly. But there are more readings, readings from TEPCO on the site and other readings in the wide area around the plant. These readings are reported selectively and the readings given are often very outdated. Other sources, like the Japanese national television (NHK), report many more readings and those readings are much more alarming.
So even in the middle of the crisis the atomic industry is downplaying the risks. Evident damage is not mentioned, radiation readings are presented selectively and irrelevant reassuring information is presented. And this adds up to the bad track-record the atomic industry already has.